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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 16-4446 
____________ 
 
SANDEEP NAYAK, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
MCNEES WALLACE & NURICK LLC;  
BRIAN F. JACKSON; ANNE E. ZERBE; CGA LAW FIRM 
 __________________________________  
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania  
(D.C. Civ. No. 1-15-cv-00933) 
District Judge: Honorable Yvette Kane 
__________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 27, 2017 
Before:  AMBRO, KRAUSE and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: July 28, 2017) 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
Sandeep Nayak appeals from an order of the District Court dismissing his 
complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  For the reasons that 
follow, we will affirm. 
2 
 
 Nayak filed a civil action in the United States District Court for the Middle 
District of Pennsylvania in October 2013 against his attorneys, the CGA Law Firm, Anne 
E. Zerbe, and Zachary Nahass.  He alleged claims of civil conspiracy and fraudulent 
misrepresentation, arising out of their representation of him in an employment matter 
against Voith Turbo, Inc., his former employer.  In the main, Nayak’s claims related 
specifically to the negotiation of a termination agreement with Voith Turbo on his behalf, 
which he thought was inadequate.  Voith Turbo offered Nayak a settlement agreement, 
under which he, in exchange for leaving and waiving his legal claims, would receive an 
extended paid leave of absence through December 31, 2013, as well as a $10,000 
payment towards his legal fees.  Nayak signed the agreement but then complained that he 
was unlawfully coerced into settling by Zerbe.  Nayak alleged that the terms of the 
agreement did not reflect the terms he expected, namely, that he remain employed with 
Voith Turbo until at least September 2015.  Nayak alleged that Zerbe fraudulently altered 
the Release, and he further alleged that the $10,000 payment towards his legal fees 
constituted a “kick back payment” to Zerbe in exchange for her participation in the 
alleged conspiracy to settle with Voith Turbo.1 
 The defendants filed a motion seeking to have the complaint dismissed.   The U.S. 
District Judge assigned to the case granted the motion, dismissing Nayak’s complaint in 
part for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and in part for insufficient 
service of process.  Nayak then filed an amended complaint and the defendants moved to 
                                              
1 We note that Nayak has a separate pro se civil rights action pending in the Middle 
District of Pennsylvania against Voith Turbo itself and certain of its employees, see D.C. 
Civ. Nos. 14-cv-01053 & 14-cv-02211. 
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dismiss it too.  Once again, the District Judge granted the motion.  While noting that the 
amended complaint was subject to dismissal for Nayak’s failure to timely serve it, the 
District Judge concluded that Nayak’s claims failed, in any event, on the merits.  
Accordingly, in an order entered on May 19, 2014, the District Judge dismissed Nayak’s 
amended complaint with prejudice.  Nayak appealed to this Court, and we affirmed on 
August 13, 2015, see Nayak v. CGA Law Firm, 620 F. App’x 90 (3d Cir. 2015), cert. 
denied, 136 S. Ct. 1466 (2016).  We held, in pertinent part, that Nayak did not state a 
plausible civil conspiracy or fraudulent misrepresentation claim in connection with the 
settlement agreement negotiated by his attorneys. 
 While that appeal was pending, however, Nayak filed another civil action in U.S. 
District Court against the CGA Law Firm and Anne E. Zerbe.  In this second action, he 
also named as defendants Voith Turbo’s counsel, McNees Wallace & Nurrick LLC and 
its attorney, Brian F. Jackson.   Nayak’s second complaint, much like his first, reiterated 
the employment-related disputes that arose during the course of his employment with 
Voith Turbo and the allegedly unlawful negotiation of the settlement agreement and 
general release of all legal claims.  Based on these events, Nayak raised numerous 
common law state claims in the second action, including tortious interference with a 
contract, intentional misrepresentation, civil conspiracy, contract fraud, and “third party 
beneficiary breach of contract,” among others.  Not all claims were asserted against all 
defendants.  Both the CGA defendants and the McNees defendants moved for dismissal 
of Nayak’s new complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).  The CGA defendants sought 
dismissal on the basis of res judicata; the McNees defendants moved to dismiss the 
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complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.  Following a 
review of the parties’ submissions, the Magistrate Judge, in a thorough Report and 
Recommendation, recommended dismissal of the complaint.  In an order entered on 
November 30, 2016, the District Court approved and adopted the Report and 
Recommendation, granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss, and dismissed Nayak’s 
complaint with prejudice. 
 Nayak appeals.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  In his brief, Nayak 
asserts that personal jurisdiction over the CGA defendants was lacking in the prior action 
because he failed to serve his complaint on time, and that thus the prior decision is void 
and cannot serve as the basis for the District Court’s application of res judicata in this 
case.  Nayak further asserts that the District Court erred in dismissing his complaint 
against the McNees defendants based on his signed Release because the McNees 
defendants were not parties to the Release and because the Release does not apply to the 
state law claims he asserted in the second action.  Last, Nayak contends that the District 
Court erred in finding the Release enforceable without an investigation into the facts, and 
erred in not allowing him to amend his complaint.   
 We will affirm.  We exercise plenary review over res judicata or claim preclusion 
dismissals.  See Elkadrawy v. Vanguard Group, Inc., 584 F.3d 169, 172 (3d Cir. 2009).  
Res judicata, also known as claim preclusion, applies when there has been (1) a final 
judgment on the merits in a prior lawsuit involving (2) the same parties or their privies 
and (3) a subsequent suit based on the same cause of action.  See Lubrizol Corp. v. Exxon 
Corp., 929 F.2d 960, 963 (3d Cir. 1991).  Precluding “parties from contesting matters that 
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they have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate protects their adversaries from the 
expense and vexation attending multiple lawsuits, conserves judicial resources, and 
fosters reliance on judicial action by minimizing the possibility of inconsistent 
decisions.”  Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153-54 (1979).  Here, with respect 
to the CGA defendants’ motion to dismiss and the claims stated against them in the 
second action, the parties were the same and there was a final and valid judgment on the 
merits in the prior action, which we affirmed on appeal.  We reject as meritless Nayak’s 
argument that personal jurisdiction over the CGA defendants was lacking in the prior 
action.   
 In determining whether a subsequent case is based on the same cause of action as 
a prior case, we will look to whether there is an “essential similarity of the underlying 
events giving rise to the various legal claims.”  Elkadrawy, 584 F.3d at 173.  Again, with 
respect to the CGA defendants’ motion to dismiss, the District Court correctly concluded 
that the underlying events that gave rise to Nayak’s claims in the present action are the 
same as the events that gave rise to his claims in the prior action.  In both actions, Nayak 
alleged that he retained the CGA defendants to represent him in his employment-related 
dispute with Voith Turbo; that they ultimately stopped representing his best interests; 
that, although he ultimately signed the settlement agreement and Release, the terms of 
that agreement were different from the terms he expected; that he was suffering from 
anxiety and depression when he signed the agreement; and that his settlement included a 
$10,000 “kick back payment” from Voith Turbo to Zerbe.  The District Court correctly 
concluded that the acts complained of in the present action are the same as those 
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complained of in the prior action, and that the demand for relief was also the same in both 
actions, see United States v. Athlone Industries, Inc., 746 F.2d 977, 984 (3d Cir. 1984).  
Where these elements are found, a plaintiff is barred from litigating not only those claims 
which were actually decided, but also those that the he might have asserted, but did not, 
in the prior action, see Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Education, 913 F.2d 1064, 1070 (3d 
Cir. 1990).  We thus agree that res judicata bars the action against the CGA defendants. 
 We also exercise plenary review over a dismissal with prejudice under Rule 
12(b)(6).  See Heffernan v. Hunter, 189 F.3d 405, 408 (3d Cir. 1999).  A Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion tests the sufficiency of the factual allegations contained in the amended 
complaint.  See Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993).  A motion to 
dismiss should be granted if the plaintiff is unable to plead “enough facts to state a claim 
to relief that is plausible on its face.”  Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 
(2007).  A claim is plausible when the facts alleged allow the court to draw the inference 
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.  See Burtch v. Millberg Factors, 
Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220-21 (3d. Cir. 2011).  Although factual averments must be accepted 
as true, legal conclusions are disregarded.  See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 
203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009).   
We agree with the District Court that all of the asserted causes of action directed at 
the McNees defendants were covered by the Release that Nayak signed as part of his 
termination agreement with Voith Turbo, and that the Release expressly applied to the 
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McNees defendants.2  The broad Release expressly and unambiguously applied to Voith 
Turbo’s attorneys, that is, the McNees defendants, and expressly and unambiguously 
applied to all claims, including common law state claims.  Pennsylvania law applies in 
this diversity action; thus, the intention of the parties governs and the “intent of the 
parties [is] gleaned from the language of the release.”  Evans v. Marks, 218 A.2d 802, 
806 (1966).  
The District Court further concluded that, unless Nayak could establish that the 
Release was procured by fraud, duress, accident or mutual mistake, he could not 
overcome its binding consequences, and we agree.  “A signed release is binding upon the 
parties unless executed and procured by fraud, duress, accident or mutual mistake.”  
Three Rivers Motors Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 522 F.2d 885, 892 (3d Cir. 1975).  See also 
Kent v. Fair, 140 A.2d 445, 447 (Pa. 1958).  Nayak cited no legal authority nor did he 
                                              
2 The Release provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 
 
General Release and Waiver of Claims.  Employee, ... for and in 
consideration of promises made herein, does hereby irrevocably and 
KNOWINGLY, VOLUNTARILY, and unconditionally waive and release 
fully and forever any waivable claim, cause of action, loss, expense, or 
damage, of any and every nature whatsoever against the Company and its ... 
agents, ... attorneys ... arising from any occurrence or occurrences, from the 
beginning of time until the date on which Employee signed this Agreement, 
including without limitation any waivable claims arising or in any way 
resulting from or relating to Employee’s employment with Company or the 
December 31, 2013 termination thereof….  Employee specifically waives 
… any waivable claim under any common law theory.    
 
Appendix, Motion to Dismiss, Docket Entry No. 24, at 64-65. 
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plead any facts that would allow him to invalidate the Release based on fraud, duress, 
accident or mutual mistake.  He was represented by counsel throughout the process and 
his essential allegation -- that facing termination is financially and emotionally stressful 
and that he unilaterally misunderstood the nature of the agreement -- is factually and 
legally insufficient to state a plausible claim for fraud, duress, accident or mutual 
mistake, for the reasons expressed in the Report and Recommendation.  Nayak does not 
convincingly argue otherwise in his brief on appeal. 
Last, the defects in Nayak’s complaint could not have been cured by any degree of 
liberality in construing the allegations of the complaint, and no possible amendment 
could have cured the defects in his claims.  No factual investigation was needed before 
dismissing the action, and the District Court correctly denied leave to amend the 
complaint, because an amendment would have been futile, see Grayson v. Mayview State 
Hospital, 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).  We also reject as meritless Nayak’s 
argument in his Reply Brief that the Magistrate Judge is biased against him, see 
Securacomm Consulting, Inc. v. Securacom, Inc., 224 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(party’s displeasure with legal rulings is not adequate basis for recusal). 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court dismissing 
Nayak’s complaint as to all defendants. 
